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The Society of the Muslim Brothers ‒  
An Islamist Political Party? 
Participation in a Confined Political System 
 
ELISABETA-CRISTINA DINU 
 
 
 
Founded by Hassan Al-Banna1 in 1928, the Society of the Muslim 
Brotherhs grew from organized groups of activist students2. Concerned with 
capturing the hearts and minds of the Egyptian educated youth, it arose from 
within the predominant social cleavage. By the turn of the twentieth century, the 
central issue of Egyptian identity revolved around two opinion blocks: the 
modernists, whom argued that renaissance was possible only trough adopting 
western values and benefitting from their social, cultural and political products 
‒ the solution was the rule of law and secularization; and the Islamic revivalists 
whom considered that Egyptians could benefit from western technological 
advancements, while concomitantly reinforce Islamic values and liberate Egypt 
from foreign occupation. Islamic scholars feared “that the liberal secular camp 
aimed to replicate Atatürk’s national model in Egypt”3, viewing the long Ottoman 
inheritance as a symbol of the legitimate persistence of Islam in politics. 
Springing from “that particular temporal and geographic context”4, the 
party was to grow from Al-Banna’s eagerness to spread the teachings of Islam, 
the Ikhwan’s Islamist nature becoming an outcome of both the country’s 
historical context and confessional structure. 
 
 
THE MASS PARTY 
 
After he graduated, Al-Banna was assigned to teach in Isma’iliyya. He 
became an informal leader in the community and extended his activism, 
                                                 
1
  Hassan Al-Banna was the son of the ma’dhun, imam and teacher of Buhayra, a small 
province of Mahmudiyya; he gained a traditional education that culminated with his 
studies at the Dar al-‘Ulum University in Cairo. 
2
  Groups of activist students were organized by Al-Banna both in the Dar al-‘Ulum and Al-
Azhaar University. 
3
  Gary Wood, Virginia Tech, Tugrul Keskin (eds), Sociology of Islam, Brill, UK, 2013, p. 6. 
4
  Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties A New Typology”, Party 
Politics, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, p. 171. 
ELISABETA-CRISTINA DINU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 3  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
426
mastering direct communication with people5, while seeking to penetrate as 
many sectors of the society. While focusing on the local sources of power6, the 
first mass party dimensions were contoured: the infiltration into the local social 
groups and the creation of extensive arrays of supportive organizations. 
Whilst Al-Banna focused on his activism in Isma’iliyya, he did not 
forget the student circles he organized in Cairo, and maintained contact “with 
his friends with whom he had pledged himself to serve the message of Islam”7 ‒ 
from its infancy, the Society possessed political parties’ dimensions: 
“permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications 
and other relationships between units; was concerned with seeking followers at 
the polls or in some manner strived for popular support”8. The organization also 
performed specific political party functions: articulated to its followers the 
concepts and meanings of the broader community9 and it was intimately 
involved in recruitment and the selection of future opinion leaders10. In the first 
three years of its existence, the Society endeavored the enlargement of its 
membership; soon, it had headquarters in Isma’iliyya11 and a large base of 
permanently active dues-paying members that made efforts “to disseminate the 
party’s ideology and establish an active membership base”12. The rural 
environment was favorable for gathering adherents by the activation of the 
disenfranchised elements of society. The interwar period marked the beginning 
of the production of statistical data13, breading the peasant question: public 
intellectuals evoked images of rural decay and criminality that could only be 
answered through social reform, to achieve rural renaissance. A complex of 
new values had to be introduced, since some contemporary views blamed rural 
poverty on peasant culture. New moral and social education was the solution. 
                                                 
5
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, 
Princeton University Press, Kindle Edition, p. 21. 
6
  The local sources of power were the Ulama, the sheikhs of the Sufi orders, the leading 
families and the social and religious societies. 
7
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1993, p. 7. 
8
  Joseph LaPalombara, Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, p. 6. 
9
  Articulated to its followers the concepts and meanings of the broader community even if 
the ultimate aim was to modify them profoundly or even destroy the broader community 
and replace it with something else. 
10
  Joseph LaPalombara, Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties...cit. 
11
  The building that represented the headquarters of the Society was purchased out of funds 
coming from local contributors, including the Suez Canal Company. 
12
  Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p. 178. 
13
  Statistical data regarding peasantry crime and the use of addictive substances among 
peasants was gathered and soon linked with other social ills, such as literacy. In interwar 
Egypt literacy levels were very low and progress was minimal. Little more than 10% of 
the Egyptian population was literate in 1920, reaching only 15% before WW2. 
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As Inglehart and Norris argue, “the poorest societies14 live with much greater 
vulnerability to forces that threaten their existence, so they're more likely than 
those in developed nations to rely on religion for hope”15. Thus, interwar 
Egyptians were a sure target for a religious fundamentalist mass party on the 
rise that was “seeking to reorganize state and society around a strict reading of 
religious doctrinal principles”16. 
For al-Banna, it was essential to create an identity-movement that 
would embody Islamic values and ideals in everyday life, reformulate societal 
norms and practices to be more Islamic and weave a new identity for Egyptians. 
Hence, after establishing the headquarter, the Brothers built a mosque, a school 
for boys, a boys’ club, and a school for girls, focusing on its welfare providing 
dimension, a pattern of establishing local community service projects that 
would later replicate in other areas. 
The Society grew by the outbreak of WW2 to have representative and 
diverse membership. A magazine17 was published and weekly lectures were 
institutionalized, marking “the first stage through which all members must pass, 
the stage of propaganda, communication and information”18. As the mass party 
model, it managed to reach the most sought after social groups in both rural and 
urban areas: the peasants, the laborers, the civil servants and the students. The 
“fundamental units of political life became pre-defined and well-defined social 
groups, membership being bound up in all aspects of the individual’s life”19, 
therefore individual social choice becoming encapsulated into the mass party. 
 
 
           The Dynamics of Participation 
  
Three factors shaped the nature of the Brotherhood as a political party: 
(1) the nature of the Egyptian political elites; (2) the quality of the political 
system and (3) the ideological profile of the party; the (4) organizational 
structure of the group shall be treated as a response to the former. 
                                                 
14
  According to a Gallup Polls study conducted in 2003, 92% of the subjects that live in countries 
with a GDP per capita lower than 2000 $ answered that religion is an important part of their daily 
lives, compared to 7% in countries with a GDP per capita bigger than 2000 $. 
15
  Steve Crabtree, Brett Pelham, Religion Provides Emotional Boost to World‘s Poor, March 6, 
2009, Gallup, viewed 10 Feb. 2014 http://www.gallup.com/poll/116449/religion-
provides-emotional-boost-world-poor.aspx. 
16
  Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p. 182. 
17
  The press became in time the second largest project of the Society: it began with a 
newsletter ‒ The Letter of the General Guide (1931) that grew in a few moths into a 
journal, The Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. 
18
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 13. 
19
  Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy ‒ The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1. no.1, 2005, p. 7. 
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The emergence of Gunther and Diamond’s Traditional local notable 
party, Duverger’s Internally created party or Aaron’s Personnel party, was at 
the early stage of party politics conditioned by the local elite. In Egypt, the 
power-holding group arose as a result of the faceoff between two institutions of 
military slavery: the Mamluk and the Ottoman ‒ “this slave-recruited manpower 
was the backbone of the army and of the administration”20. Both European and 
Oriental emerging elites had an exclusive nature; yet, the former was an active 
economic and political actor, while the later had monopoly on the use of 
force21.While Egypt remained a province of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
dynasty founded by Muhammad 'Ali continued to rule, the Ottoman-Egyptian 
elites were destroyed by the British intervention in the local army. To balance 
the economic and the authority crisis, “deft and stiff-necked management”22 was 
introduced in Cairo, a new Egyptian army being raised beginning with 1882 
under British officers, while the local military based elites were deprived of 
their power. 
Thus, Katz and Mair’s cadre party era (Fig.1.1), where parties emerged 
within the intersection of the civil society with the state are fit for the European 
model; in colonial Egypt, due to the destruction of the local elites the gap 
persisted between the two (Fig.1.2.), pushing the emergence of political parties 
directly into the second developmental stage. In theory, in the mass party era, 
the civil society and the state were linked through the party (Fig. 2.1). Yet, in 
Egypt the mass party was anchored in the civil society and only attempted to 
connect it to the state (Fig.2.2.), since conflict was institutionalized through 
party competition only in theory. 
European-style constitutionalism and political pluralism were 
introduced in Egypt (1923-1952), while the lack of an indigenous politically 
strong bourgeoisie and the excessive powers of the monarchy were going to 
impede the experiment. Despite a multiplicity of political parties, elections, 
parliamentary sessions, and freedom of the press, the constitution was 
repeatedly ignored and altered. Still the Brotherhood “never rejected 
                                                 
20
  Gabriel Piterberg, “The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the 18th Century”, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, Aug, 1990, p. 275. 
21
  The military nature of the Egyptian elites can still be counted as a vivid factor in 
contemporary politics, since overlapping military and political power characterized both 
post-1952 Egypt and the post-revolutionary power-struggle that followed the 2011 
uprising. 
22
  M.W Daly (ed.), The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 
1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Histories Online, 2008, p. 240. 
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participation in parliamentary elections in principle [and] its founder attempted 
to run for parliament”23. 
           As the externally created model24, the Ikhwan challenged the ruling 
group and demanded representation, having anti-colonial rhetoric and a well-
articulated ideology. At the group’s sixth general conference (1941) the 
Brothers decided to field candidates for parliamentary elections. Seventeen 
candidates were slated to participate in 1942, with al-Banna as a candidate for 
the district of Isma’iliyya; subsequently summoned by the prime minister and 
pressured to withdraw from the race, the Brothers eventually stepped aside. In 
the second electoral episode (1945) al-Banna and five Brothers ran for 
Parliament, but amid widespread allegations of electoral fraud all of them were 
defeated. While the Ikhwan constantly condemned the corruption of the 
political system, as well as its continued vulnerability to British interference, its 
alienation from the formal political order was deepened: electoral competition 
proved to be ineffective, reinforcing the group’s anti-Western attitude and 
marking the debut of the Society’s transformation into an “anti-system” party. 
Begining as “an organization outside and against the political order”25 and after 
facing electoral disappointment, the group reoriented towards (a) influencing 
the king to achieve reform and remained loyal to the throne26. 
The end of the WW2 set off a new phase in the nationalist struggle 
against Great Britain: by October 1945 (b) the Brothers organized protests in 
seven cities, while a National Committee of Students and Workers was 
organizing massive strikes. Although a big number of Brothers participated with 
full power in the strikes, officially “the Muslim Brothers were not ready”27. A 
pattern can be identified in the anti-system activity of the Ikhwan: 1946, 2008 or 
2011, Cairo, Shubra Al-Khaima or Al-Mahalla Al-Kubra, mobilization was 
achieved through student associations and workers associations or trade unions, 
while the official position of the Society was not explicitly stated ‒ Brothers 
were free to participate individually. At a first glance not linked with the 
Society, the organizations were pre-defined and well-defined social groups that 
                                                 
23
  Amr Hamzawy, Nathan J. Brown, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist 
Participation in a Closing Political Environment”, Carnegie Papers, nr. 19, March 2010, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 6. 
24
  Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, Armand Colin, Paris, 1973. 
25
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 42. 
26
  A link between Al-Banna and the Palace existed: the founder of the Society was disturbed 
when “the king and the foreigners’ had come to fear his movement” (Richard P. Mitchell, 
The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 40). A constantly recurring story is that Banna 
was consulted prior to the appointment of some Egyptian prime ministers and in 1947 he 
even attended a royal banquet. At one point, the king declared in a discussion with the 
prime minister: “we erred in smashing the Brothers” (Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of 
the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 41). 
27
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 45. 
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stood as “the fundamental units of political life”28 and were encapsulated into 
the Brotherhood. 
(c) The violent stage of the anti-system party pried in 1947 as a result of 
the crisis in party leadership29, which activated the secret apparatus 
simultaneously with the Society’s preparations for intervention in Palestine. By 
October 1947 Banna ordered the Society to (i) prepare for Jihad. Rapid 
mobilization was possible through the already established Battalions and 
through the contribution of recruits from among army officers, including some 
of those that would later participate to the 1952 Revolution. 
In January 1948, while Ikhwan battalions were fighting in Palestine, the 
British controlled government confronted a group of young Brothers in the 
outskirts of Cairo, discovering 165 bombs and cases of arms; one month later a 
judge that sentenced a Brother to prison was assassinated by members of the 
secret apparatus. On November 15th the government forces discovered a 
meeting of the members of the secret apparatus: “Papers and documents, from 
[a] briefcase, from memorandum pads, diaries, wallets, and other personal 
records in the homes of the arrested men provided the first public disclosures of 
the existence of the secret apparatus”30. The Brothers were charged with (ii) the 
intent to overthrow the political system through terrorism and several 
accusations of violence. Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha was soon assassinated 
by “a young man dressed in the uniform of an officer”31. After several attempts 
of the Ikhwan to destroy the discovered files, on the 12th of February 1949 the 
founder of the Society was assassinated by the political police. Authority was 
naturally passed to the second in command, Salih ‘Ashmawi, proving that the 
Society met the last political party criterion set by LaPalombara and Weiner: it 
proved to have continuity in organization, since the duration of its existence was 
not dependent of the life span of its founder. A shuffling of leadership followed. 
Although the party’s determination to achieve its political goals was 
underlined during the trial, at the conclusion of the court case the order 
dissolving the Society was lifted. In October 1951, Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi, a 
judge for more than 25 years, was appointed the new Supreme Guide ‒ it was 
no surprise the sentences were easy. 
In the attempt to connect the civil society and the state, the only chance of the 
Brothers was now to (d) topple the regime, since electoral participation, 
                                                 
28
  Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization...cit.”, p. 7. 
29
  The split was generated by a moral charge against the Secretary General, ‘Abd al-Hakim 
‘Abidin (who was Banna’s brother in law) that split the opinions inside the party in two 
voices: although the charges could not be proved, some said that ‘Abidin had to be 
dismissed for purification, while others wanted to acquit him. Another conflict within the 
party was created around the debate of whether or not the Brothers should cooperate with 
the Wafd Party. 
30
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 64. 
31
  Ibidem, p. 67. 
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influence exerted on the king and violence did not generate impact. By May 
1952 liberation battalions made out of university students took the streets. 
Material which would reconstruct the link between the revolution and the 
Brothers is limited, but it is known that they had strong links with the army32 ‒ 
“without the enthusiastic support of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohammad 
Naguib’s movement might already have met the fate of the half dozen Egyptian 
Governments that preceded it. The Brotherhood was a full participant”33 and 
recalled with pride their contribution to the first three days of the revolution. 
However, the success of the revolution only laid the foundations for the 
conflation of the state and the army into a form of patrimonialism that was 
going to impede the post-Arab Spring pseudo-democratization effort34. 
          By 1954, Nasser had consolidated his position as the head of the 
government, while the Brotherhood’s repeated calls for the application of 
Shari’a and its public support for General Naguib had already provoked 
Nasser’s antipathy. After being subject of an assassination attempt that was 
blamed on the Society, within a couple of weeks 500 Brothers were in jail, 
including the leaders. Following a clash between Brotherhood university 
students and the police, Nasser dissolved the Ikhwan on January 13th 1954, 
putting an end to the mass party stage of the Society. 
 
 
Ideological Profile 
 
The Ikhwan’s ideology grew from the Shari’a and a highly conservative 
reading of Islamic sacred texts and juristic precedents. Partly due to the 
Brotherhood’s emphasis on action over ideology “its conception of Islamic rule 
remained vague, framed less as a particular form of government than as a 
utopian end state offering a panacea to all of the problems confronting the 
                                                 
32
  Anwar al-Sadat was the first to connect the Army and the Brotherhood. He was replaced 
as a liaison by Abd’ Al Mun’im ‘Abd al-Ra’uf, who was known for being among the most 
active figures of the Free Officers and at the same time chief propagandist of the Society. 
He began recruitment among army members, generating the officers’ involvement in 
Palestine, when Mahmud Labib, a former member of the army came to lead the 
Brotherhood battalions. The recruited officers were brought to the “instruction in the 
message” that was followed by the formal oath that signified their entrance into the Secret 
Apparatus, securing their collaboration. Labib’s most important contact with the Free 
Officers was made through Gamal ‘Abd Al Nasir in 1944, appearing that from this time 
on the Brothers were in touch with the man that led the revolution. 
33
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 101. 
34
  Eva Bellin, „The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, vol. 36, second issue, January 2004, 
Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the University of New York, p.145. 
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Muslim community in modern times”35. Egypt was wrecked due to the gradual 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the British occupation, since “Islam is 
religion and state”36 and permitted the country to fall into “religious, cultural, 
political, economic, social, legal and moral decadence and impotence”37. 
Although they considered that Muslims failed their role of preserving the ideals 
and goals of Islam, “the leading legal minds of the Society observed that the law 
imported into Egypt, apart from a few exceptions was in agreement with Shari’a 
and did not violate its general principles”38. 
The Society’s conceptual justification of the ruling class39 can be 
treated in terms of supernatural justifications: Prophet Muhammad gave to his 
followers the final Truth and final Revelation; for these reasons God stands with 
them, and if the wisdom of the Shari’a and the Qur’an is respected, they shall 
have absolute legitimacy. From a rational perspective, for the Brothers the 
people are the source of the ruler’s power, who cannot evolve into a tyrant since 
he “receives authority from the people, who grant it because he will obey the 
law”40. Paradoxically, reminding of Hobbs, Locke and Rousseau, Banna 
describes the relation between the ruled and ruler as a social contract. Rejecting 
hereditary rule, he accepts democracy, as long as it is adapted to the teachings 
of Islam and the ruler is designated by the people, therefore even elected41. 
The concept of Jihad, viewed by the Brothers as “the legitimate use of 
force”42 cancels the validity of the rational political formula: thus, the source of 
legitimacy is a set of supernatural beliefs, granting the group infallible 
legitimacy due to its prophetic nature. The fundamentalist party, “founded to 
pursue a broad reform agenda”43 is proto-hegemonic by nature, leaving “no 
room for conflicting interpretations of the religious norms that serve as the basis 
of the party’s programme and of laws which it seeks to impose on all of 
society”44; due to “its arrogation to itself of the exclusive authority to interpret 
God’s will ‒ and rejection of the legitimacy of opposing viewpoints”45 the 
Society’s ideology gained a rigid and coercive tone. 
 
                                                 
35
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 42. 
36
  Gerhard Bowering (ed.), The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2013, p. 381. 
37
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 212. 
38
  Ibidem, p. 241. 
39
  Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, McGraw-Hill Publishers, New York, 1939, p. 167. 
40
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 243. 
41
  However, the truthfulness of the fact that a party or an individual is representing the 
people is not conditioned by the electoral turnout. 
42
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 25. 
43
  Amr Hamzawy, Nathan J. Brown, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood...cit.”, p. 3. 
44
  Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p. 182. 
45
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 25. 
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Organization 
 
By the beginning of the 1930s, the Society had a full-time paid clerical 
and administrative staff and periodically organized general conferences; given 
its far-reaching objectives, “the organizational development of the party and the 
scope of its activities were extensive”46. 
Whilst the hierarchy was based on a tripartite division between the 
General Guide, the Guidance Council and the Consultative Assembly (Table 1), 
authority relations within the party were generally undemocratic. As the 
externally created party model47, the Society was centralized, ideologically 
coherent, disciplined and aggressive in making demands on the system; it relied 
on an extensive array of supportive organizations, and had two particularly 
noteworthy organizational dimensions: first, the welfare providing field 
apparatus (Table 2), which grew out of the Ikhwan’s perennial concern for 
“maximum involvement in worldly affairs”48. As a religious fundamentalist 
party, it mobilized support “by invoking religious doctrine and identity, [and] 
by performing a wide range of social welfare functions which aid in recruiting 
and solidifying the loyalty of members”49. 
The Society’s success was guaranteed by the recruitment of students 
and teachers and the substitution of the poor public health system, through the 
dissemination of information and the increase of facilities and personnel50. The 
“foundation of every healthy society was the virtuous individual”51, bringing 
about social reform and morality, in accordance with the teachings of Islam. In 
an environment dominated by political instability and corruption, although not a 
class based organization, the Ikhwan “disproportionately attracted support from 
the poor and downtrodden and the marginalized middle class, among whom 
denunciations of injustice and corruption had a particular resonance”52, because 
no other party in interwar Egypt made issues of social and economic reform an 
essential part of its platform, but rather focused on their relations with the palace. 
The second dimension was (2) the secret apparatus. In October 1941 
Banna was certain that the British intelligence was planning to exile him and 
destroy the Society. The threat generated the final stage of the organizational 
                                                 
46
  Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p. 182. 
47
  Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, cit. 
48
  Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt Islam And Democracy: Critical Essays, American University 
Press, Cairo, 2002, p. 36. 
49
  Ibidem. 
50
  The Brotherhood’s rover units were the first to bring hygienic knowledge and medical 
care to the countryside in Egypt. 
51
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 254. 
52
  Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p. 183. 
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planning: late in 1942, the special section/secret apparatus was created. In 
1937, the battalions (a paramilitary branch) were formed also. These 
organizational developments corresponded in time with the beginning of the 
Brothers’ concern for Palestine and shall be seen as a form of adaptation of the 
political party to the political environment. As Al-Banna himself explained in 
1938, “secrecy was necessary in the beginning of any movement to assure its 
survival”53. Inspired initially by the concept of Jihad, both the battalions and the 
secret apparatus were rationalized as an instrument for the defence of Islam and 
the Society. 
 
 
THE CATCH-ALL PARTY 
 
The populist socialist single-party system (The Arab Socialist Union) 
fuelled the metamorphosis of the Brotherhood, which remained a prime target 
of the state. The anti-system era of the Society that culminated with its 
proscription, convinced its leaders of the catastrophic results of direct 
confrontation with the regime. Since outlawed political parties tend to continue 
functioning underground and exert pressures to re-emerge, the Society 
reappeared transfigured: it “was cracked down three times but it has always 
reemerged”54. 
In 1970 Nasser died and was succeeded in his post by Vice President 
Anwar Sadat, who called for the correction of the revolution, which included an 
amnesty to the Brothers and their release from prison (1971 to 1975). Many 
returned then from exile. Sadat’s solution for Egypt’s burdensome situation55, a 
shift from left to central-right policy, triggered the discontent of the Society’s 
traditional target groups, making the 1970s subject of the rise of independent 
Islamist student associations, which grew to join the Ikhwan. Sadat’s brave 
move to make peace with Israel enlivened the feeling of betrayal among Arabs 
as well; the Camp David Accords generated the perfect opportunity: 
“resembling a state with its armies, hospitals, schools, factories and 
companies”56, the Society was now competing directly with the state apparatus. 
After failing to anchor the civil society into the state, through electoral 
or violent means, the Brotherhood reoriented towards performing itself the 
functions of the state that was isolated from its citizens. What started as a 
complex mechanism of establishing a large base of supporters became an 
                                                 
53
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 254. 
54
  Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt Islam And Democracy...cit., p. 36. 
55
  Egypt spent half of its budget on the military, the Sinai Peninsula was under Israeli 
occupation and its most important source of income, the Suez Cannel, was unusable. 
56
  Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 66. 
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opportunity to exercise control and substitute the absence of the state, the 
Society acquiring the “ability to frame the terms of reference through which 
[Egyptians] filtered politics”57. As a result, when the Brotherhood was 
oppressed it continued to operate as an inert mechanism preponderantly through 
the field apparatus. Although the central organization was almost annihilated 
during the Nasser era, the local structures could not be destroyed ‒ once 
institutionalized, its “organizational structure was ‘frozen’ and became resistant 
to pressures for change; [therefore] parties may retain sizeable mass-
membership bases and institutionalized ties to secondary associations even after 
the party has adopted a predominantly catch-all electoral strategy”58. 
After Hudaybi’s death in 1973, the new leader ʿUmar al-Tilmisani 
asserted that the Society would reject now any violent action against the state: 
“what concerned the Brotherhood was not the person of the ruler but the type of 
government and the harmony of its laws with the principles of the Shari’a”59. 
The Ikhwan was now presenting itself as ready to cooperate with the regime, 
adjusting by its “instinct of self-preservation”60 to the constraints imposed by 
the party system 61. Al-Tilmisani would declare years later: “if one strategy does 
not succeed, we will abandon it and seek out another strategy [that is more 
effective]”62. 
Sadat’s liberalization experiment culminated with ending the ASU: 
“from March 1976 on, the Union was to feature three formal political platforms, 
representing the Left, the Right and the Center”63. Following the 1976 
parliamentary elections, in which “the regime-backed center platform won an 
overwhelming majority of seats”64, Sadat authorized the conversion of the 
platforms into legal political parties65. 
The 1976 parliamentary elections saw ASU’s three factions and 208 
independents competing against each other. Brothers ran as independents and 
six of them won seats in the Parliament. Hence, the Ikhwan succeeded for the 
first time in linking its supporters to the state, specific party function66. 
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Resembling an electoralist party, the Society was now focusing on 
maximizing votes for its independent candidates, while avoiding direct 
confrontation with the regime. Since “any political activity based on religious 
considerations”67 was prohibited, their conversion into a regular political actor 
was impeded, reinforcing “the inclination of its senior leaders to remain outside 
the formal legal system”68. 
 
 
Electoral Politics in the Mubarak Era 
 
Hosni Mubarak’s inauguration as Egypt’s president in 1981 marked the 
beginning of a new stage in the Society’s development: it expanded its presence 
in public life and became the leading opposition actor, invoking “the language 
of democracy to challenge the conditions of its own exclusion”69. 
The catch-all Brotherhood had a distinct dimension: Mair, Katz, Gunter 
or Diamond, the catch-all party emerges in functional democracies, where “in 
an effort to expand its electoral appeal to a wide variety of groups, its policy 
orientation is eclectic and shifts with the public mood”70. In the case of the 
authoritarian military regime of Egypt, the catch-all party had to respond also to 
pressures exercised by the system in which it functioned, facing a double 
dilemma: it had to pose as liberal to be allowed to operate, but not too liberal, so 
it would not lose its fundamentalist supporters. The internal factional struggles 
revolved around “which games to prioritize and how to balance the regime and 
electoral games”71. The persistence of this double dilemma during the Mubarak 
years was showcased by the General Guides, whom reassured the movement’s 
critics on both sides of the ideological spectrum of the correctness of its 
gradualist approach. 
In the May 1984 elections, after the parliamentary electoral system 
became list-based, the Ikhwan entered into a tactical alliance with the Wafd. 
With the Society still in incapacity to function legally, the secular nationalist 
party provided a legal channel, while the Society offered a large base of 
supporters. Eight seats went to Brotherhood candidates in 1984. In the 
parliamentary elections of April 1987, the group joined the Socialist Labor 
Party and Liberal Party72, forming the Islamic Alliance. Thirty-six seats went 
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then to the Society, making it the biggest opposition bloc in the Parliament and 
enhancing its institutional dimension: represented in the Parliament, the Society 
was able to influence decision making and hold the government accountable for 
its actions, becoming a channel of expression by representing the people by 
expressing their demands73. Without applying legally for a party license and 
although the NDP’s large majority in the assembly limited the Society’s ability 
to initiate legislation the Brotherhood MPs started to influence policy making74. 
Initially, the catch-all look of the Brotherhood banded its supporters and 
the state; now the group comprised two factions (Fig. 3): the mass party 
branches, established by the founder himself and the catch-all arm. The 
electoralist body had a skeletal existence that succeeded at election time by 
collaborating with the mass structures, springing into action to perform its 
primary function, the conduct of the campaign75. Unlike the purely electoralist 
model which utilizes ‘modern’ campaign techniques such as the mass-
communications media, the Ikhwan still relied on the mobilization of party 
members and affiliated organizations, becoming a hybrid party - its transition 
towards the electoralist model was delayed by the authoritarian presidential 
regime. Its behavior in particular affected the quality of the pseudo-democracy, 
since the Society used “the regime’s own references to democracy against it by 
highlighting the gap between its rhetoric and practice”76, focusing as in the early 
years of the party on the procedural issues of the regime. 
 
 
Structural Change 
 
The experience as elected public officials of some of the Brothers and 
“the institutional rules of authoritarian electoral politics”77 stirred organizational 
and ideological transformation. 
While the dominant ideological cleavage inside the Society was now between 
the old guard and the new wave, the middle generation took over during the 90s. 
Due to their activity in professional environments, the middle-generation 
Islamists moved closer to Western life-style, engaged in dialogue and 
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cooperation with other groups, departing from traditional self-isolation: “while 
the higher executive post was still the turf of the older [prison generation], 
middle aged members formulated policy, acted as spokesmen, and represented 
the group in the Parliament and professional unions”78. More progressive 
interpretations of Islam were articulated79, the Brothers affirming support for 
party pluralism as a natural expression of God-given differences and seeking to 
bind “as wide a variety of social interests as possible [to] maximize votes by 
positioning themselves toward the centre of the spectrum, appearing moderate 
in their policy preferences and behavior”80. 
While the Ikhwan’s vocal criticism of the Mubarak regime generated an 
offensive against it that intensified a week before the 1995 parliamentary 
elections undermining its ability to run an effective electoral campaign, the 
factional disputes became for the first time public. In 1996 a Brotherhood 
reformist branch announced its plans to form a new party submitting a proposal 
to the Political Parties Committee. The reformists thought that the reason for the 
group’s failure was the Ikhwan’s status as a technically illegal organization that 
placed it in a state of vulnerability to repression and impeded its full integration 
into the political system. The Wasat Party was to be a “civic platform based on 
the Islamic faith, which believed in pluralism and the alternation of power”81; it 
had 74 founders out of which 62 were Brothers. As the catch-all model, the 
Wasat attempt was pluralistic, had a “shallow organization, superficial and 
vague ideology, and overwhelmingly electoral orientation”82. The old guard 
opposed the creation of the Wasat, leading to the failure of its 
institutionalization. Try-outs to establish the party existed in 1998 and 2004; 
each time the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the initiatives. 
“The period from 1995 to 2000, when the Brothers’ best minds were 
imprisoned”83 transposed the internal ideological conflicts to organizational 
changes. Reformist trend leaders advocated changes in the Ikhwan’s inner 
practices in favor of a more democratic distribution of power; how democratic 
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the interior decision-making became is hard to acknowledge, but the newly 
founded committees84 indicate an increasing specialization of roles and a 
reduction in the scope of the sections’ activities, specific to catch-all parties, 
which rely on professionalized staff85. 
 
 
Revolution: Concluding the Transition 
 
The authoritarian regime of Egypt postponed the Ikhwan’s evolution to 
the electoralist model. The Brotherhood’s rise was concomitant with the fall of 
the state-regime, showing their codependence and similarities. 
The factors that influenced the equilibrium of Mubarak’s personal 
authoritarian regime were both international and domestic86. The West’s attempt 
to reactivate its role as a promoter of democracy overseas since the early 2000s 
sheltered “autocratic but compliant friends by allowing its client regimes to 
continue the game”87 and made the opposition media “come out of its shell”88 in 
Egypt. In the domestic arena the authoritarian tripod comprised, according to 
Kassem, the adoption of exclusionary laws, the use of patronage and skillful 
cooptation and the coercive apparatus of the state. The latter proved unable to 
counter free expression and mass mobilization through the internet, its failure to 
exert social control becoming a determinant of revolution89. 
Social determinants of revolution broke out in waves, accentuating the 
growth and spread of generalized belief in change90. The press published reports 
on corruption, its boldness culminating in 2007 with the rumors that Mubarak 
was “gravely ill, possibly even dead”91. The partial liberalization of the media 
did not stop the police-state from maintaining its coercive nature through 
ingrained methods, such as arrests of Brothers and various journalists. 
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The event that broke the pattern of the daring game was the Al-Mahalla 
Al-Kubra strike. A few dozen workers, employed at Misr Spinning and Weaving 
Company, took part in a strike that was violently repressed by the state security 
authorities. In an effort to extend the protest, a Facebook group was created, 
encouraging people to strike on April 6th92. After the group received about 
65.000 likes, activists and workers started to prepare carefully the countrywide 
general strike. According to the official page of the April 6th Youth Association, 
no one planned to create a movement, but only to support the workers at Al-
Mahalla Al-Kubra. Yet, “the aspirations and limits of the urban intelligentsia 
were demonstrated”93 when the initiative failed in to expand these initially 
limited labor protests into a general strike. 
The Society did not participate officially in any of the uprisings, yet 
acted through subsidiary organizations, such as the A6YA ‒ treated in this paper 
as an alias of the Brotherhood faction opposed to the old guard, a group of 
marginal elites comprised preponderantly of Ikhwan youth94. The A6YA’s 
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connection between the Society and the 6th April Youth Association are the domains of 
activity/fields of study of the subjects, which coincide with the syndicates in which the 
Brothers are powerful since the mid 1980s: 85 of the subjects are students or activate in 
the field of engineering; 49 of the subjects are students or activate in the field of medicine 
or pharmaceutics; 32 of the subjects study law; 24 of the subjects are students in the field 
of business and commerce and 21 of the subjects are students or activate in the field of 
journalism and communication. 
The most famous founding members of the Association also fall in one of the categories 
above: Asma Mahfouz, a 29 year old Egyptian woman that graduated from Cairo 
University with a BA in Business Administration, was many times credited to be among 
the precipitating factors. She launched a “vlog”, where she posted videos encouraging an 
uprising; the most important one was posted on the 18th of January 2011: “Four 
Egyptians have set themselves on fire, thinking maybe we can have a revolution like 
Tunisia” (Meet Asmaa Mahfouz and the vlog that Helped Spark the Revolution [video 
file], 1 Feb. 2011, viewed 19 Feb. 2014, <http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=SgjIgMdsEuk>). 
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activity was a key element for the mass mobilization of the 25th of January 2011 
and underlined three pivotal aspects of the Society: (1) although the Ikhwan was 
close to completing its transition to the electoralist model, the grass-root 
structures of the party were frozen and became resistant to pressures for change, 
the Society maintaining its support and control over the syndicates and student 
associations; (2) the restraint with which the Brotherhood operated officially 
during the revolution showcased the experience of an anti-system party 
proficient in surviving a constant no-clashes fight with the regime ‒ as in 1952, 
the replicating pattern indicates that without the support of the Society, the 
uprising would have had the fate of the many protests preceding it; (3) the 
Ikhwan was one step closer to the catch-all model, since it utilized modern 
mobilization techniques. The new media was of crucial importance: young 
Brothers chose Facebook, Twitter and YouTube “to send the news of their mass 
protests”95 proving the weight of “the mass-communications media over the 
mobilization of party members and affiliated organizations”96. The fact that the 
authorities started harassing Brothers one day before the protests shows not only 
that the Society was behind the mobilization, but also that the 25th January 
protests were planned long before the Tunisian uprising. 
The structural strain facilitating the revolution, according to which “the 
potential for collective violence varies with the intensity and scope of socially 
induced discontent among its members”97 was two-dimensional: the rapidly 
growing population left its numerous youth absent from public life, while the 
weakened status of the middle class was generalized. The revolutionary 
marginal elite intellectual movements whom originated in this unrepresented 
middle class, assembled well-coordinated masses, organizing the 25th of January 
Tahrir Square mass protests. These individuals are normally a product of state-
sponsored university education and oriented towards state-based activities98, 
“structural change transforming their identities and structure and affecting their 
                                                                                                                       
Ahmed Maher is a 34 year old engineer, who declared when interviewed in December 
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opportunities”99. In Egypt, these marginal elites were a product of the 
Ikhwan100, which not only interceded their fabrication, but channeled their 
uprising as well, guaranteeing the structural conduciveness that permits or 
encourages collective behavior and the mobilization of participants for action101. 
Mubarak’s public reaction to the Day of Anger displayed his belief that 
“his security forces and military had a tight grip on the country”102, while he 
stressed the “impact of infiltrators who tried to force slogans that resulted into 
innocent victims among the protestors and police forces”103. Protests extended 
and on the 30th the military moved aggressively to take control of Cairo. After 
Mubarak was presented as meeting with military leaders on the national 
television, on January 31st the army officials announced they would not use 
force against the demonstrators, “recognizing the protests as freedom of 
speech”104. Mubarak addressed the people again, on February 1st, reaffirming 
that he would not resign105. Pressures escalated on February 2nd when pro-
Mubarak demonstrators106 entered Tahrir Square by the thousands, generating 
prolonged violence. On the 5th the leaders of Egypt’s ruling party resigned. 
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01 february 2011 speech on egyptian uprising [video file], 1 Feb. 2011 YouTube, viewed 
7 Jan. 2014, < http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nz5ZkO2jb4s> ) 
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  When pro-Mubarak protestors were captured by opponents, they desperately stated that 
they were paid by the government to participate; others turned out to be carrying police 
ids, while dressed as civilians. According to Shadi Hamid, this is an old strategy of the 
authorities to try to break up the protests: “They're dressed in plain clothes, and then 
they'll usually go and attack the protesters. Egyptians have seen this for quite some time, 
and that's why they were able to recognize what was going on fairly quickly” (The CNN 
Wire Staff, Who are the pro-Mubarak demonstrators?, CNN, 2 Feb 2011, viewed 20 
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The Brotherhood emerged as an actor officially one day later, when it 
participated to negotiations with the vice president, Omar Suleiman. Since the 
political future of the Society was unclear when protests erupted107, they did not 
fully join the protests until it became an obvious mass uprising. As they 
behaved previously, their position was rather grey ‒ Brothers were free to 
participate as individuals both to the Mahalla strike and the 2011 uprising; 
many of them did, without the organization declaring its official involvement. 
The motivation of this peculiar stance is that the Brothers wanted to 
avoid a transformation of the erupting revolution into an Islamic one: first, 
because it would have had a harmful effect on their electoral future; second, 
because they reoriented since the Nasser era towards a non-confrontation policy 
towards the regime. Yet, its members “had a major role in fighting off 
Mubarak’s goons on Tahrir Square on February 2nd when the Brothers took to 
the front lines and suffered the majority of injuries”108. 
This episode demonstrated the completion of the process – as a catch-
all party, the Society exposed itself to a wider range of opinion, without sliding 
into a radical religious frame, but rather suggesting to secular Egyptians that 
they are not radical Islamists, showcasing their “overriding purpose to 
maximize votes, win elections and govern”109. Thus, the Ikhwan aligned with 
secular opposition parties and associated its image with Mohamed ElBardei, 
proving it had “the resources and social engineering capacities to bring about 
social change”110. 
After the third defiant speech of the president (February 10th) when he 
stated he will not resign until September, on February11th, the Vice President 
announced the resignation of Mubarak. Following his resignation, the position 
of President of Egypt was officially vacated and replaced by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, 
who assumed executive control of the state for the following six months, 
dissolved the Parliament and suspended the 1971 Constitution. 
The Army created an eight-member panel to draft amendments to key 
articles of the constitution. The proposals were released publicly on February 26 
and a referendum was organized on the 17th of March 2011. Egyptians have 
strongly backed the constitutional changes111: the turnout was of 41.2%, out of 
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which 77% agreed with the changes. The Ikhwan called for a “yes vote”, while 
remaining one of the most important political powers together with Mubarak's 
NDP. Essam al-Aryan called the result a “victory for the Egyptian people”112, 
while both parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled. 
On the 30th of April 2011 “the popular Islamic movement long banned 
from politics announced that it has formed a political party”113: The Freedom 
and Justice Party. The secretary general of the Brotherhood, Mahmud Hussein, 
declared that the party will be independent from the Ikhwan, but will coordinate 
with it. As during the protests, the Brothers proved once more that they sought 
to stay away from the radical religious image. The FJP was a civil party, with an 
Islamic frame of reference, founded by the Society114. After decades outlawed, 
the FJP brought the Ikhwan into legality; it was now able to lawfully participate 
in politics, becoming a fully established electoralist catch-all party. 
 
 
THE CARTEL PARTY 
 
The cartelization process of the FJP was facilitated by the SCAF’s legislative 
input, displaying what was labelled as the „honeymoon” phase of the SCAF and the 
Brotherhood. Thus, the FJP showed signs of early cartelization before the 
parliamentary elections, while betting its best bid: the electoral laws115. 
The electoral laws issued by the SCAF after the Egyptian uprising not 
only gave a leg up to the Brotherood, but prompted the other political groups 
aspiring to the legal party status into calling upon the Ikhwan’s grassroots basis 
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  Yolande Knell, Egypt referendum strongly backs constitution changes, 20 March 2011, 
BBC, viewed 15 April 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125> 
113
  Amro Hassan, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood creates political party, 30 April 2011, Los 
Angeles Times, viewed 13 March 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/30/world/la-
fg-egypt-brotherhood-20110501. 
114
  Official web page of the Freedom and Justice Party, viewed 9 March 2014, 
http://www.fjponline.com/view.php?pid=3. 
115
  The specifics of the electoral system were established by the May 30 PA Law, which was 
modified seven times until elections started. However, the final form of the law provided 
a mixed electoral system: two-thirds (332) of the representatives were elected through a 
closed-list proportional representation system , in forty-six multiseat constituencies, and 
the remaining third (166) would be elected as individuals in eighty-three two-seat local 
districts. The draft law permitted both party-backed candidates and independent 
candidates to form election lists, while “the 50 percent worker and farmer quota was also 
included, as required by the March 2011 constitutional declaration”115. The President had 
the constitutionally granted right to appoint another ten members, raising the total number 
of seats to 508. 
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and financing. Although the revised political parties law issued  on March 28 
maintained the preexisting ban on parties established on the basis of religion 
and social class, it „required that new parties register five thousand members 
from at least ten governorates publish their names in two daily newspapers”116. 
The expenses associated with these requirements obstructed groups with 
limitted resources, implicitly favouring the Brotherhood. Evidence indicates that 
the Wasat party faced the challenge of establishing branch offices and building 
a mass constituency in the short time preceding the parliamentary elections by 
relying on the Brotherhood’s field apparatus117.  
The deal with its traditional ally went from the jure to de facto and 
soon, the FJP was a part of an Alliance that contained over forty parties, from 
secular to Salafi Islamists, narrowing the policy space. Emerging „with 
remarkable speed to overthrow a long-standing regime, [it] quickly built a post-
revolution consensus and emerged as a hegemonic force”118. Yet, the alliance 
fell apart, beginning with a few small secular parties; the Wafd Party followed, 
its leaders feeling that the entire alliance was dominated by the Brotherhood. By 
October, only eleven parties remained in the alliance and it became more 
obvious that the FJP was dominating the partnership. 
Egypt’s first parliamentary elections after the fall of Mubarak were 
postponed from September to begin November 2011. On the 28th of November, 
Egyptians voted in the first free elections since Mubarak's fall, “yet, the 
revolution was far from complete”119; various citizen rights were violated 
during the electoral process, proving that “the formal rules about how political 
institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually 
happens”120, the concealed informal rules, based on clientelism and 
particularism, remaining the real guidlines. The elections, held in three phases121 
were to prove soon that attempting to institutionalize elections and their 
surrounding freedoms is not enough. The turnout of 54% could be read “as a 
                                                 
116
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 172. 
117
  According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, when she met Abou Elela Madi in April (Head 
of the Wasat Party and former member of the Brotherhood), he had just returned from 
Hurghada and was expected in another town the following day; „in July, he was 
unavailable to meet because he was attending a party conference in Ismailiyya” (Carrie 
Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 173). 
118
  Micheline Ishay, „The Spring of Arab Nations? Paths toward Democratic Transition”, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, nr. 1-11, 2013, p. 3. 
119
  Jeffrey Fleishman, Egypt voters endure long lines at polls, 29 November 2011, Los 
Angeles Times, viewed 7 March 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/29/world/la-
fg-egypt-elections-20111129. 
120
  Guillermo O’Donnell, „Illusions About Consolidation”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, 
1996, pp. 34-51/p. 39. 
121
  Different regions proceeded to the polls on November 28th, December 14th and January 
3rd. 
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strong show of confidence in the election process”122 while the Society’s 
superior organization was proven by the results123. 
Egypt’s new Parliament held its inaugural session on January 24th 2012; 
the secretary-general of the FJP became the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, while the FJP and Salafi parties took the lead in selecting the 
one-hundred-member Constituent Assembly: half of the seats were allocated to 
members of Parliament and the other half to constitutional law experts and 
representatives of various civil and political groups. Approved by the 
parliament on the 25th of March, more than 66 out of 100 members of the CA 
were associated with the Islamist trend; many sectors of the society were 
underrepresented. Although an effective consolidation of power was 
envisaged124, the incapability to build political consensus125 was the factor that 
would inhibit transition from its dawn. The power struggle over the composition 
of the CA reflected the conflict of interests between Islamist and secular groups 
in the parliament; the attempt of the FJP Alliance and the Salafis to limit 
competition mirrored “the basic purpose of a cartel to maximize joint profits 
[…] through the restriction of competition”126, while the Brotherhood’s 
versatility was to act as a liason between  the  ultraconservative Salafis the 
secular block.   
While the liberal and social democratic parties tried to boycott the 
elections, a group of lawyers and political activists filed a suit with the Higher 
Administrative Court asserting that the assembly was unrepresentative and 
demanding it would be dissolved. The Court declared it unconstitutional, since 
according to the March 2011 Constitutional Decree, the MPs were responsible 
for electing the Constituent Assembly, but were not allowed to be a part of it. 
Although the court’s “decision to suspend the assembly took a procedural rather 
than political angle, it was also clearly addressed to the broader issue of 
Islamists’ domination”127. Thus, the democratic transition’s incipient failure 
proved to be a result of the gap between formal and informal rules, confirming 
                                                 
122
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 250. 
123
 `The Brotherhood-led Democratic Alliance won over a third of the total casted votes 
(10.138.134 votes), while the Islamic Alliance, a coalition of three hard-line Salafi parties 
led by the al-Nur party, came in second with 7.534.266 votes. Parties with a clear secular 
orientation altogether captured about 20%.  
124
  `The Muslim Brothers managed to “build a broad consensus without abandoning 
completely their ideological core (thereby legitimizing Salafist claims to be the true 
representatives of Islam)” (Micheline Ishay, „The Spring of Arab Nations?...cit.”, p. 6) 
but alienated, however, the secular Egyptians and the Copt minority. 
125
  Ibidem. 
126
  Mark Blyth, Richard S. Katz, “From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political 
Economy of the Cartel Party”, West European Politics, vol. 28, no. 1, January 2005, pp. 
33-60/p. 39. 
127
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 250. 
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the lack of legitimacy of the former128. Furthermore, in the cartelized 
environment where parties have tacitly agreed not to compete over certain 
issues, voters had no effective power over politicians after elections; the Ikhwan 
proved to misrepresent its intentions and, once placed in power by its voters, to 
exploit the informational asymmetries to its own advantage129. 
The FJP’s efforts to form a government were also dismissed by the SCAF. By 
claiming that forming the government was a right reserved to the president, the 
cabinet nomination was postponed until a new head of state was elected. 
Thereby, within the diffusion of ideologies process as a consequence of the 
revolution130 that facilitated the cartelization process, while forced to cooperate 
in order to fight against the SCAF, the catch-all behavior of the FJP Alliance 
and the Salafis was to face structural limits.  
While the specifics of the electoral system were being  modified seven 
times before elections, the parties aiming to compete in the parliamentary 
elections supported a transformation of the electoral system that assumed a shift 
from voting for individual candidates to voting for candidates aggregated into 
lists (proportional representation). The shift to a party-list system would force 
candidates to clarify their positions on various topics via political 
programmes131, facilitating the exposure of the Brotherhood’s double-identity 
and  jeopardizing the cohesion of any affiliation with other actors of the latter.   
 The revolutionary conflict may be considered itself a factor that 
facilitated cartelization, since “conflict among groups is proposed to strengthen 
group cohesiveness and separateness”132. Thus, the SCAF was now supported 
by secularist parties and competed with the Brotherhood-dominated Islamists. 
Although the dictator was long gone, the SCAF still exerted pressures on the 
political system, having almost unlimited powers. The double dilemma of the 
Brothers did not disappear, but replicate at the level of the Alliance and in 
relation to the Salafi, proving the limitations of the regime change: “concerted 
action aimed at transforming a social system or overthrowing a regime is 
sometimes called revolution, without reference to its impact or outcome”133. 
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  Guillermo O’Donnell, „Illusions...cit.”. 
129
  Mark Blyth, Richard S. Katz, “From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation…cit.”, p. 45. 
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  Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?”, cit. 
131
  As one civil society activist put it: „When candidates run as independents, they are not 
forced to develop political programs. By contrast, a list system will force candidates to 
articulate clear agendas, it will encourage real politics and transparency. Now everyone 
says they support ‘social justice’, but there is a difference in the approach, say, of the 
Wafd and leftist groups. Such differences will become manifest in a list system”(Carrie 
Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit.,p. 173). 
132
  Robert Ted Gurr, “The Revolution…cit.”, p. 381. 
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  Ibidem, p. 361. 
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 The Presidential Elections 
 
 Since the Brotherhood’s influence on the constitution making process 
was weakened, and having a strong majority in the legislative was not offering 
the possibility to form a government, the best bid was now the presidential 
election. The Ikhwan’s nomination of Khayrat al-Shatir134 for president and the 
push for an Islamist CA exacerbated suspicions, highlighting their attempt to 
monopolize power. 
 On the 14th of April 2012, Egypt's Presidential Election Commission 
removed ten candidates from the future presidential ballot135, proving that 
patterns of authority did not change. All candidates were disqualified on the 
basis of legal irregularities. The Brothers had now to run their backup candidate, 
Muhammad Mursi136,“a quintessential organization man who was loyal to the 
old guard and faithful in carrying out their directive”137. 
 The initial round of Egypt’s presidential elections took place on May 
23rd and 24th. The top contenders were two Islamists and two officials from the 
old regime: Mursi battled Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh for the Islamist vote, 
while former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik challenged former Foreign Minister 
Amr Moussa for secular support. The turnout was of 46% and none of the 
candidates managed to get majority. Mursi came in first with 24.7% and Shafiq 
second, with 23.6%. 
 By June 12th the Parliament had elected a new CA, giving again 
absolute majority to the Islamists, although the group was now smaller in size – 
57 members. In response, due to “a letter sent a day earlier by Tantawi”138, on 
June 14th the SCC (formed of judges appointed by Mubarak) dissolved the 
parliament. This well-orchestrated move, that occurred two days before the 
second round of presidential elections aimed at making the Ikhwan loose “its 
power base in the parliament, [so] Ahmad Shafiq would receive a boost”139. 
This episode proves that the change of “the operating norms of institutional life 
                                                 
134
  Khayrat al-Shatir is a wealthy businessman that is considered to be the key element in the 
mobilization of the Brotherhood youth during the revolution.  
135
  Among the disqualified ten candidates were three front runners: Khayrat al-Shatir, Hazim 
Abu Ismaʿil (an ultraconservative Salafist) and Omar Suleiman (former vice-president). 
136
  Muhammad Mursi was an engineer with a Ph.D. from the University of South California, 
a former independent MP (2000 to 2005), and a member of the Society’s Guidance office. 
137
  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 256. 
138
  Edmund Blair, Egypt's military ruler orders parliament dissolved, 16 June 2012, Reuters, 
viewed 2 Feb. 2014, < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/16/us-egypt-election-
parliament-idUSBRE85F0L520120616 >. 
139
  David Hearst, Abdel-Rahman Hussein, Egypt's supreme court dissolves 
parliament and outrages Islamists, 14 June 2012, The Guardian, viewed 3 March 
2014, < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/14/egypt-parliament-dissolved-
supreme-court >  
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and more specifically some of their practices and policies, together with the 
replacement of institution elites”140 did not occur as a result of the revolution. 
Although the cartelization of the governing Islamic coalition ensured a limited 
competition among them, the power struggle between the SCAF and the elected 
rulers of Egypt proved “the inability [of the latter] to suppress political 
opposition”141. 
 The defection of the revolution was the military's willingness to 
continue to support the old regime customs.  First, the SCC ruled that the 
Political Isolation Law142 passed by Parliament was unconstitutional, clearing 
the way for Shafiq to candidate and second, the SCC nullified the election 
results for a third of the seats in the legislative, triggering immediately the 
dissolution of the Parliament by the SCAF, whom assumed legislative authority 
until elections for a new parliament were held. The SCC ruling of June 14 that 
led to the dissolution of Parliament also placed the legal status of the CA in 
doubt. The voters that supported the third block of candidates were 
disappointed, and started feeling that they had to choose between two evils: 
“maintaining the Mubarak regime, or Islamizing the country”143; Egyptian 
democracy “lied in the ability of voters to choose from a fixed menu of political 
parties”144. The runoff between Mursi and Shafiq began on the morning of June 
16, 2012; “proper procedures were generally followed” 145. 
 The second ballot of the presidential brought the Salafis and Brothers 
again on the same side of the cleavage. Despite the frail junctions between the 
Ikhwan and the Salafis, „Al-Nour and popular Salafi Call preachers campaigned 
vigorously for Mursi”146. 
 Despite the expectance of a low turnout, the percentage of casted ballots 
increased to 51.9%. Since Mursi’s victory was predictable, the army 
orchestrated another strategic maneuver: the SCAF issued a supplement to the 
Constitutional Declaration of March 2011147, enlarging its powers. While the 
announcement of the official results of the elections was delayed by the election 
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  Robert Ted Gurr, “The Revolution…cit.”, p. 361. 
141
  Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization...cit.”, p. 23. 
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  The Political Isolation Law had the purpose of blocking high members of the old regime 
to run for elections. 
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  Rosefsky Wickham, op.cit., p. 259; 
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  Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization...cit.”, p. 21. 
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  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 263. 
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  Jonathan A.C. Brown, The Rise and Fall of the Salafi al-Nour Party in Egypt, 14 
November 2013, Jadaliyya, viewed 3 March 2014, < http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/ 
index/15113/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-salafi-al-nour-party-in-e > 
147
  Article 53 of the supplement noted that the SCAF would have full authority over the 
armed forces, including control of the Ministry of Defense and all military appointments 
and promotions while Article 60 gave the power to contest the decisions of the CA to the 
SCAF and the SAC. The supplement also gave senior state officials effective veto power 
over the provisions of the new constitution. 
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commission investigating claims of fraud on both sides, protestors returned to 
Tahrir Square. Fearing that Egypt's military was plotting to hijack presidential 
elections results to give victory to the candidate it supported, the „expectation 
that a fair electoral process will continue into an indefinite future”148 was fading 
away. The Brotherhood actively participated to these protests, proving both 
their popular and organizational support and their importance in articulating 
“the specific claims and counterclaims being made on the existing 
government”149. 
On the 24th the official results were announced: Mursi won150. An 
Islamist had become the democratically chosen president of a modern Arab 
state. After holding a speech in Tahrir Square, when he declared that “no 
institution can be above the will of the people”151, Mursi was sworn in on the 
30th of June. 
 
 
 Mursi’s Presidency: The Rise and Fall 
 
 On July 8, Mursi issued a decree reinstalling the dissolved Parliament 
ordering that it would function until another PA would be elected two months 
after the new constitution (which was yet to be drawn up). The government’s 
failure to maintain its responsiveness or accountability to citizens after 
elections152 fed not only the latent civic discontent, but also the reaction of the 
SCAF that demanded the cancelation of the decree. While the Brotherhood and 
secular parties were working to fabricate consensus on the new constitution, 
Salafi Islamists took the streets (July 29), when „Tahrir Square became the 
scene of a massive demonstration calling for the establishment of an Islamic 
state”153. Absorbed by the depths of the secular-Islamist cleavage154, the 
dynamic of the cartelized Ikhwan indicates its tendency to depart from the civil 
society “to such an extent that [it would] become a part of the state apparatus 
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  Guillermo O’Donnell, „Illusions...cit.”, p. 36. 
149
  Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?”, p. 436. 
150
  Mursi won with 13.2 million votes (51.7%), against 12.3 million for Shafiq. 
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  Egypt's Morsi defies military in fiery speech, 30 June 2012, Al Jazeera, viewed 26 March 
2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201262916347287161.html. 
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  Guillermo O’Donnell, „Illusions...cit.”, p. 36. 
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  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 193. 
154
  „On the one hand, the Brotherhood and the Salafis were part of the same ideological 
current and any stand taken by the Brotherhood against the Salafis would open it to the 
charge of having abandoned the Islamic cause. On the other hand, identifying too closely 
with the Salafi movement would undermine the credibility of the Brotherhood’s 
democratic commitments and threaten the fragile cross-partisan alliances it had forged 
with secular groups.” (Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 195). 
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itself”155. Rather than looking towards the state for resources, the cartelization 
process occurred as means to achieve the Islamic state, the goal of politics 
becoming self-referential. 
 The Society’s activity during Mursi’s presidency indicated an eagerness 
to monopolize power that grew initially out of the confrontation with the SCAF, 
highlighting the absence of a fundamental condition for the success of the 
democratic transition, as identified by Linz: a state of affairs in which “none of 
the major actors [...] consider that there is any alternative to democratic 
processes to gain power”156. Backed up by the lawyers of the FJP that argued 
that the SCC invalidated only a third of the seats of the Parliament and had no 
reason to suspend the entire PA, the president restored the dissolved legislative. 
In the afternoon of the first session of the Parliament, the SCC requested the 
second time its dissolution threatening the president with criminal charges if he 
does not conform. During this crisis, the SCC had absolute powers in the 
absence of a constitution, generating a “power struggle between the elected and 
unelected arms of the Egyptian state, with the Brotherhood-dominated 
presidency and parliament at odds with state institutions headed by Mubarak-era 
appointees”157. 
 The first cabinet in post-revolutionary Egypt was appointed in August. 
In the Hesham Quandil Cabinet seven ministers remained in position back from 
the military regime158, while the FJP assumed a limited number of cabinet seats 
in key ministries159. By now, the FJP coalition and the Salafis realized they 
shared a mutual interest in collective organizational survival160, showing an 
increasing inter-party collusion, cooperation and “interpenetration of party and 
state”161. The cabinet “reflected the precarious balance of power between the 
president and the military”162 and the exhaustion of the Ikhwan’s efforts to 
include the military into the ruling cartel. 
 On the 12th of August President Mursi reversed the June addendum that 
was limiting his powers and returned to his full executive and legislative power. 
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  Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization...cit.”, p. 50. 
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  Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood...cit., p. 267. 
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  For example, the Defence Minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi remained in position. 
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  Ibidem, p.16. 
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  Egypt's Morsi swears in new cabinet, 02 Aug 2012, Al Jazeera, viewed 3 March 2014, 
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The defence minister together with the army chief of staff were forced to retire; 
both Tantawi and Sami Anan became Mursi’s advisors, in a move described as 
“a soft coup against the military”163, which marked the end of the Brotherhood’s 
efforts to attach the “old faces” to the ruling cartel. Thus, the hegemonic 
Brotherhood proved to be incapable of developing a shared worldview among 
the disparate segments of the population, failing to deliver social/economic 
goods and ultimately not being able to establish order164. 
 
 
 The Monopolization of Power 
 
 On the 9th of October the president issued a decree pardoning165 more 
than 1.000 people166 ‒ the expansion of presidential powers marked the second 
stage of Mursi’s presidency, while simultaneously the relations with its allies 
and the military were weakened: the state was used as “an institutionalized 
structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders”167. 
 The decision of The Administrative Court of the State Council 
regarding the constitutionality of the CA was postponed four times, giving time 
to the parliament to approve the law providing the CA immunity from 
dissolution. Although the SCAF did not approve the law the Administrative 
Court referred Law 79/2012 to the SCC, giving the Islamist-dominated 
legislative more time to draft the constitution. The moment marked the 
beginning of the third phase of Mursi’s mandate: on the 22nd of November 
2012, he issued a Presidential Constitutional Declaration giving him sweeping 
new powers168. The move was immediately condemned by the opposition, and 
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  Bassem Sabry, Egypt's President Morsi in Power: A Timeline, 22 July 2013, Jadaliyya, 
viewed 5 Feb. 2014, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13101/egypts-president-
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regime. 
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October 2012, Los Angeles Times, viewed 5 Feb.2014, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
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  First, the investigations of those involved in the pro-Mubarak protests were going to be 
re-conducted, while “all constitutional declarations, laws and decrees made since Mursi 
assumed power on 30 June 2012 could not be appealed or canceled” (Morsy issues new 
constitutional declaration, 22 Nov. 2012, Egypt Independent, viewed 4 March 2014, 
<http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issues-new-constitutional-declaration>). 
In the fourth article, the time limit for drafting the constitution was extended by two 
months, Article 5 set that no authority could dissolve the CA or the SC and Article 6 
authorized the president to take any measures he considers necessary. 
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triggered nationwide protests that degenerated into clashes between the 
president’s supporters and protestors. 
 Concomitant with the monopolization of power, the Ikhwan started 
losing both Salafi and popular support: the same force favorable to revolution 
started impeding post-revolutionary consolidation efforts169. The Society drifted 
away from the mass-party supportive organizations to the “exclusively 
professional and centralized [ones], relying increasingly their resources on the 
benefits and privileges afforded by the state”170. Due to “technological advance, 
the secondary support organizations […] became less valuable than public 
relations expertise and media coverage”171. Thus, the Brotherhood came to be in 
incapacity to feed a high level of popular mobilization in their support: the 
institutional integrity of the state security apparatus was not jeopardized 
anymore172, giving it space to maneuver and the opportunity to rally its 
resources against the Ikhwan. In an effort to preserve the precarious power-
struggle balance, on the 23rd December the president appointed 90 Islamist 
members to the Shura Council (filling the last third of the seats) after the 
resignations coming from the liberal/Christian block of the CA. 
The opposition created the National Salvation Front, which requested the 
revocation of the PCD, while Mursi focused on organizing a referendum that 
would validate the Islamist Constitution. Held in two rounds (15th and 22nd 
December) and with a turnout of 33% the referendum endorsed the 
constitution173; on the 29th, in a televised speech, Mursi formally passed the 
legislative power to the upper house of the Parliament. The referendum 
indicates the extensive predisposition of the Egyptian citizens to vote along 
religious lines; the religious collective identities, although specific to the mass 
party era were stuck-still by the authoritarian regime, and have two dialectically 
opposed connotations in the cartelization process: (1) they are the cause for the 
failure to cartelize the entire arena (including the military), since the decline of 
religious identities is considered to be a facilitating factor for cartelization174; 
(2) they can be considered a facilitating factor for the emergence of the cartel on 
one side of the cleavage, the Islamist one. The latter conotation explains, as 
well, the timing of tensions between al-Nour and the Ikhwan breaking out 
publicly – the Salafis’ main objective was to lock Egypt’s legal regime into a 
Sharia framework, thus the validation of the Islamist Constitution lessened the 
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essentiality of the Salafis’ histrionic and conciliatory behaviour in relation to the 
Brotherhood from then onwards.  
On January 5th 2013 the Quandil cabinet was reshuffled, leading to an increase of 
the Ikhwan’s salient presence in the executive175: all the newly appointed ministers, 
although officially independent, were “Brothers to the core”176, enkindling the 
concerns of the other political actors.  Elections for the PA were announced to 
take place in April, while the SC was working on the electoral legislation. 
 
 
 Losing Grip 
 
 While coming closer to the state, the Brotherhood ceased to be a 
channel of communication for its supporters, whom now “needed to make 
themselves demands on the party/state”177. In the following months protests 
against Mursi marked the beginning of the fourth phase of his presidency: while 
the Society was struggling to consolidate its position, its “limited capacity to 
manage change”178 resurfaced. Although the Brothers negotiated with 
opposition groups to stop violence, clashes continued in Cairo, reaching the 
peak in February, when demonstrations were brutally oppressed. Gradually, 
accusations of abuse against the Mursi regime emerged179, the Brothers losing 
popular support, a key element for the success of a revolution180.  
 The limitations of the self-protective mechanisms of the cartel were 
highlighted when the Salafis turned publicly against the Brothers. On the 23rd of 
January Khaled Alam Eddin, a senior al-Nour member and Mursi’s presidential 
advisor, „openly accused the Brotherhood of exclusionary behavior”181, 
declaring: „we disagree with the Brothers on the monopoly of power”182. The 
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reversal of the cartelization process intesified on January 30th, when al-Nour 
and the NSF announced that they shared a common vision; on February 15th the 
Salafis joined the NSF in their call for a new government. The Brothers were 
now standing alone.  
 While the cartel limited the possibility of intra-organizational dissent 
and minimized the consequences of competition, it also “prevented elections 
from performing their minimal feedback function”183. To maintain balance, the 
cartel had to institute “neocorporatism”184 by “reversing the economic setbacks 
resulting from the uprisings and address the intractable economic weakness185 
that served as the uprisings’ fuel”186. Their failure to offer privileges to the 
interest organizations (be they parties, the SCAF, or non-political actors) fast 
enough led to the gradual destruction of the cartel, inverting the initial 
consolidation process. 
 On February 21st Law 2/2013 amending on the LOPA and the LEPR 
was passed by the FJP dominated legislative. On March 6, the SAC revoked the 
President’s call for elections and referred Law 2/2013 to the SCC for a ruling on 
whether the amendments to the LEPR and LOPA laws were constitutional. In 
the following days the number of injured and dead protestors increased; the 
ruling of the SCC was pended. 
 On the 22nd of March the Cairo headquarters of the Society were 
attacked; several activists were arrested for encouraging violence against the 
Brothers ‒ “the anti-Brotherhood sentiment was on the rise across Egypt”187. 
 As the Brothers’ first desperate move, on the 11th of April 2013 the 
Islamist dominated SC passed a new electoral law, incorporating most of the 
amendments introduced in the SCC’s previous rulings, before the SCC issued 
its final ruling on Law 2/2013. Secondly, on 7 May 2013, the Quandil cabinet 
was reshuffled the third time: 9 ministers were replaced, increasing the number 
of the FJP members to 12 out of total 35. Additional to the 12 official brothers, 
other senior figures of the Ikhwan were named ministers188,outlining the attempt 
of the Brothers to counterbalance the loss of the Salafis’ support. 
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 On the 26th of May 2013 the SCC made its final ruling: first, the 
structure and the definition of constituencies failed to represent the population 
fairly; secondly, and most important, the SCC stated that “failing to ban the use 
of doctrinal or religious slogans or symbols in election campaigning violates 
Articles 5, 6, 9, 33 and 55 of the constitution”189. The court decided that 
allowing the President to change electoral circumstances specified in the law 
“violates the principle of election integrity and lessens the independence of the 
High Election Commission and National Elections Commission, contrary to 
Articles 55, 132, 200, 208 and 228 of the constitution.”190; the plaintiffs 
affirmed they were “regaining the state back"191. The SCC surprisingly ruled on 
June 2nd that the SC192 and the CA, which drafted the December 2012 
Constitution, were unconstitutional. 
 The alterations of the electoral laws served as a safeguard for the 
Ikhwan’s majority in both the PA and SC. By gaining stronger control of the 
legislative institutions, the FJP planned to compensate for their loss of 
popularity, while seizing the state. Concerned with controlling the future 
electoral processes as well, the FJP attempted, through the February 2013 draft 
to “change the judicial composition of the electoral committee to be formed in 
each governorate”193; on the 17th of June Mursi named seventeen new 
governors, out of which seven were Brothers. 
 After the opposition led by the NSF rejected talks with Mursi, the 
Brothers sent activists to distribute bread, while the anti-Mursi signature 
campaign Tamarod organized significant protests in Cairo; the Brothers soon 
announced a pro-Mursi meeting. 
 After Mursi delivered a rather provocative speech, mobilization was 
ordered by the Society’s leaders on the 27th of June triggering the mobilization 
of the army. When millions took the streets (June 30th), the reaction of the army 
proved once more that “the strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state's 
coercive apparatus distinguishes among cases of successful revolution and 
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revolutionary failure”194. The Salafis tried to reach compromise with the 
Brothers, but failed. While the Ikhwan insisted on the democratic right of the 
elected president to continue his term in office, 10 Egyptian ministers submitted 
their resignations. The minister of defense issued a statement from the central 
command of the army, offering a 48-hour ultimatum to the president to conform 
to the demands of the opposition. 
 Two days later, the military took over, announcing that Mursi was 
suspended from office. Change was impeded by the robustness of 
authoritarianism: the coercive apparatus was still exceptionally able and willing 
to crush reform195. The volatility of the consolidation period inevitably 
facilitated the military coup and the return to the old regime proxies196. 
 
 
. 
 
 Emerging as a religious fundamentalist mass party and morphing into a 
catch-all party, the Society proved to meet the criteria conditioning the party 
nature of the group, but failed to complete its post-revolutionary cartelization 
process, hence impeding the codependent unfolding of democratic outburst and 
consolidation. Arising „with remarkable speed to overthrow a long-standing 
regime, it quickly built a post-revolution consensus and emerged as a 
hegemonic force”197, but failed to manage the balancing act of democratization. 
 From normative participation to violence, the Brotherhood’s behaviour 
has been forced into Catch-All politics since its infancy. Since the XIXth century 
destruction of the local army was synonymous with the destruction of the local 
elites, the Egyptian political system was stripped of its first elite-parties 
developmental stage and, thus, of the emergent connection between the civil 
society and the state. The Brotherhood was to be born in the midsts of the Egyptian 
civil society’s interwar cleavage and be chocked there for almost a century. 
 The resounding systemic democratic failures experienced by the 
Brothers within their first two electoral episodes (1942 and 1945) not only 
proved the impossibility of achieving refrom via electoral competition, but also 
substantiated the Islamists’ doubts in respects to the ills of the unfit, western 
imported customs. Building on the grounds of the Brothers’ electoral 
disappointment, the concept of Jihad provided them a moral entitlement to use 
force: basing their political formula on supernatural beliefs, the religious 
fundamentalist party twisted its electoral journey into violence. After failing to 
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advocate reform by influencing the king, in 1947 the Brotherhood activated the 
Secret Apparatus and the paramilitary branches to intervene in Palestine and 
orchestrate the Coup of the Free Officers, marking thus the beginning of its the 
anti-system era. 
 Surviving severe opression under Nasser through its frozen grass-roots 
structures, the Catch-All Brotherhood hybrid was born along with Anwar 
Sadat’s amnesty and shift from leftist policy. The liberalization of the economy 
became an opportunity for the group to substitute the absence of the state 
through its Field Apparatus, enhancing its impact and facilitating its 
operationality as an inert mechanism while the Ikhwan was outlawed, whereas 
the liberalization of the political system made political participation possible: 
although political activity based on religious considerations was still explicitly 
banned198, six Brothers running as independents won seats in the 1976 
parliamentary elections, proving the group’s willingness to compromise 
ideologically to enable participation  and giving birth to the Society’s double 
dillema, enhanced by Mubarak’s inauguration: it had to pose as liberal to be 
allowed to function, but not too liberal, so it would not lose its supporters. After 
acquiring its institutional dimension by connecting for the first time its 
electorate to the state, while political programmes abided moderation 
(organically and/or confined), the Ikhwan was feigning centrism in the political 
arena, but simoultainously sharpening  its religious fundamentalist goals within 
the civil society. The 1987 elections saw the Society becoming the biggest 
parliamentary opposition block, whilst sharpening its internal division: the catch 
all politically active youth based skeletal branch was now opposing the old 
guard mass party.  
 The completion of the Brotherhood’s Electoralist metamorphosis 
proved the group’s dependency on the political regime and, thus, was possible 
only after Mubarak’s resignation – evidenced to be connected to the Ikhwan, the 
A6YA ensured the Society’s use of modern mobilization techniques, electoralis 
parties’ particularity, concluding the transition. Aligning with secular actors, the 
Brotherhood exposed itself to a wider range of opinion, proving its catch-all 
purpose to maximize votes. The first legal political identity of the Society, the 
FJP was (partially) free to lawfully participate in a pluralistic system, 
warranting  the Brotherhood’s full Electoralist Catch-all party nature.  
 Agregating a coalition around it, the FJP won a comfortable majority in 
the Parliament, aiming to narrow down the number of competing actors, to limit 
competition and ultimately maximize joint advantages by controlling the 
composition of the CA. Although fighting against the SCAF’s old customs 
stimulated increased interparty cooperation, the Catch-All behavior of the FJP 
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Alliance and the Salafis ran into a structural limit, due to the regime change 
limitation, factor which contributed to the abrupt end of the cartelization 
process. Dominated by the power struggle between the elected cartelized 
coalition (the FJP Alliance and the Salafis) and the SCAF, the post-Arab Spring 
Egyptian political arena witnessed the inability of the elected to suppress the 
practices of old regime. Although competition was limited by the ruling 
coalition, the Society’s inability to integrate the military into the ruling cartel 
led to the president’s urge to compensate by monopolizing power, unbalancing 
the cartel. Thus, the cartel’s failure to offer privileges to stakeholders triggered 
the discontent among its political allies, which culminated with the Salafis’ turn 
against the Brothers. Furthermore, since the cartelization process generates the 
reversal of the relation between party and voter, finally the Ikhwan’s loss of 
popular support shed through a new wave of anti-Mursi protests. 
 The SCAF’s progressive consolidation of power culminated with 
Mursi’s overthrow and the return to old regime customs. The revolution did not 
fail, since its failure would have brought about unwanted change achieved by 
democratic means, but was inhibitted by the SCAF orchestrated coup. What 
would have been the result in the event that the the military would have 
abandoned its old habits and joined the cartel? I believe that the rhetoric of the 
Brotherhood is a result of its multiple dilemmas puzzle; the pragmatism and 
versatility that it has shown for almost a century denote that the inconsequent 
principles of the group would have not translated into an Islamic state (an 
indicator is Mursi’s position in international politics199 during his short 
mandate), but rather displace the same double dilemma that shaped the Society 
beginning with the 1980s, transferring it to the international arena: pose as 
liberal so the international community will indulge the existence of the 
cartel/state, while simultaneously mimic a form of fundamentalism that would 
allow the group to maintain its supporters both within the electorate and among 
world leaders. 
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 Thus, proving that a religious fundamentalist movement is a political 
party does not offer legitimacy to their worldwide condemned actions, but 
rather  aims to enquire the prerequisites that made these groups venture into 
undertaking violent actions to generate political impact. If a political party that 
experienced all forms of political participation concludes that violence is the 
only efficient means of exerting real influence on the political arena (be it 
national or worldwide), shouldn’t we reassess the perspective from which we 
rationalize the functionality of a system that only reacts to (attempts of) political 
representation de facto when the actors resort to violence? 
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PCD ‒ Presidential Constitutional Declaration 
SCC ‒ Supreme Constitutional Court 
CA – Constitutional Assembly 
SCAF – Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
PA – People’s Assembly 
SC ‒ Shura Council 
LOPA ‒ People’s Assembly Law 
LEPR ‒ Regulation of the Exercise of Political Rights 
NSF – National Salvation Front 
SAC – Supreme Administrative Court  
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Annexes 
 
a. Figures 
Fig.1.1 Parties of the Cadre or Caucus Type (Richard S. Katz, Peter 
Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization...cit.”, pp. 5-28/p.10)  
  
Fig. 1.2 Parties in Egypt in the Cadre or Caucus Era 
  
Fig. 2.1 Parties of the Mass Type (Katz and Mair, op.cit., p.11) 
  
Fig. 2.2 The Society of the Muslim Brothers as a Mass Party  
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Fig. 3 The Society of the Muslim Brothers as a Catch-All Party  
  
Fig. 4 The Cartel Party (Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair, “Changing 
Models of Party Organization...cit.”, p. 13) 
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b. Tables 
1. General Table of Organization (Richard P. Mitchell, The 
Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 164) 
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2. Table of Organization: Field Apparatus (Richard P. Mitchell, The 
Society of the Muslim Brothers, cit., p. 177) 
  
 
